Operators must provide backup capacity if critical services come under attack
Under a decree issued on November 2, owners of non-state data centers must set aside 10% of their floor space and capacity within ten days. They can continue using these resources until the state calls them in. At that point, they will have 24 hours to make the capacity available.
Key point: the reserved capacity is intended for information systems on the list of socially important online resources. These are the same government portals, banks, marketplaces and social networks that remain accessible when authorities shut down mobile internet in a region. You can find part of the list in our earlier review. If someone attacks a data center hosting systems classified as systemically important, the operator must make an alternative hosting site available within 24 hours.
According to Vedomosti (a Russian business daily), Maksut Shadayev, head of the Ministry of Digital Development (Mintsifry), suggested that operators identify lower-priority customers in advance. He advised operators not to lease out the freed-up capacity. If they do lease it, they should warn customers that they may have to vacate within 24 hours. He also suggested terminating contracts for capacity that has not yet been brought into service.
Outages are inevitable
Let’s do the math.
At the end of 2025, Russia had 85,800 rack spaces in commercial data centers, and the market was worth about 178 billion rubles (about $2.17 billion). These figures from iKS-Consulting and Alfa-Bank appear in a TAdviser review (TAdviser is a Russian IT market analytics portal). Ten percent comes to about 8,600 racks.
There is virtually no spare rack capacity. According to iKS-Consulting, occupancy at Moscow and St. Petersburg sites is close to 100%. Moscow and the Moscow region account for 80% of all rack spaces in the country, and St. Petersburg for another 7%. Together, that is 87%.
In all of 2025, the industry added about 4,600 new racks, half as many as in 2024, according to the same market review. The capacity the state is reserving is almost twice the capacity the industry built in a year.
What exactly the state is requisitioning
At the meeting, officials clarified that the state will take facilities with powered rack space. This means prepared floor space with a power supply, rather than servers or processors. Operators still have not received a calculation methodology. It remains unclear whether the reserve should be measured in rack spaces, servers or processors. A holding company can build the reserve across several of its sites and choose the facility itself.
The requirement does not apply to state and municipal owners or to data centers damaged by strikes.
Who pays, and how much the industry stands to lose
Until the state requests the reserved capacity, operators must cover its upkeep themselves. The decree provides for payment only for resources actually handed over. A subcommission sets the price cap (the same body that decides on requisitions).
Expert Artyom Semenikhin estimates revenue losses for operators at 15–20 billion rubles (about $180–240 million) a year. If operators lease racks at a discount on condition that customers vacate them on short notice, the market will lose 3–6 billion rubles (about $40–70 million).
Mintsifry’s call to disconnect customers raises questions
Aleksandr Likhman, a lawyer at the law firm Lidings, notes that the decree requires operators to reserve resources, not to make them available. It also does not give operators an automatic right to terminate customer contracts. Lawyers at B1 (the former Russian practice of EY) write that the decree defines neither the procedure for freeing up capacity occupied by customers nor the consequences for existing contracts. They recommend that operators assess whether suspending service would be lawful, and that customers check the terms of their contracts.
Mintsifry may propose treating the freeing up of capacity as a force majeure event. In that case, the operator would not be liable to the customer for breach of contract. However, the state does not commit to covering the costs either. The operator would then lose the customer, pay for upkeep and possibly receive no payment for the resources.
On top of that, the government has not yet appointed the members of the subcommission that will administer this operator “tithe.” Yet operators must reserve capacity starting November 12. What exactly to reserve, how and where remains unclear.
Recommendations for website owners
Check where your server is physically located. The decree covers commercial data centers in Russia. If you rent a virtual server or rack space from a Russian provider, this may affect you too.
Reread your contract with the provider. Lawyers explicitly recommend this to customers. Look at the terms on suspension of service, provider liability and force majeure. If authorities issue clarifications on force majeure, providers may rely on them under this clause.
Make a backup and store it off-site. This is a general rule, but it is especially relevant now: you will get only 24 hours’ notice before the capacity has to be made available.
Assess where you rank in the priority system. The ministry has suggested that operators rank customers in advance. Nonprofits and independent media outlets are unlikely to rank highly. In general, we would advise “low-priority” customers to move their websites right now.
Moving abroad won’t solve the problem
The question suggests itself: if the state can requisition capacity inside the country, why not just leave?
Where can you relocate relatively quickly? Russian providers operate data centers abroad and accept direct payment in rubles: Timeweb in Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Almaty, Beget in Latvia and Kazakhstan, AdminVPS in Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, and Webhost1 in about ten countries. Some providers with a wide geographic footprint accept Mir cards (Russia’s national payment card system). UFO Hosting operates in 14 countries, and ISHosting in more than 40. Russian cards do not work for direct payments to Western hosting providers such as Hetzner or DigitalOcean.
Moving does not take you out of the regulator’s reach. The companies listed above are Russian legal entities subject to the same law. Operating abroad does not change their legal status or that of their customers.
The law also prevents companies from moving all their data abroad. The primary database containing Russian citizens’ personal data must remain in Russia. Anonymized and non-personal data can be moved abroad.
Cross-border data transfers also require a formal procedure, and it takes a long time. We covered this recently.
Russia can block websites hosted abroad just as easily as those hosted domestically.
It’s a vicious circle. Inside the country, the state can requisition capacity within 24 hours to support services on the government allowlist. Outside, you face the localization requirement, the data-transfer procedure and the same risk of blocking. No arrangement puts an organization outside the state’s control perimeter. The only option is to move entirely abroad and cut ties with Russian providers, but even then you cannot avoid blocking.
Recommendations for developers of censorship-circumvention tools
The requisitioning of capacity and the disconnection of “low-priority” customers mean migration: some projects will move, including abroad. If you track where Russian services are hosted, document the current state of the infrastructure now. This process has already begun.
Monitor where government infrastructure is relocated. The same decree allows the subcommission to use foreign capacity with the approval of the FSB (Federal Security Service).
If some government resources end up on foreign sites, authorities will not be able to block their IP ranges without disrupting government services. Historically, such ranges have proven convenient for carrying transit traffic. A scheme that relayed traffic through Russian clouds on the allowlist worked this way until authorities shut it down in January.
Infrastructure resilience has become a key consideration. The argument that hosting in Russia is more reliable no longer holds (if it ever did). Keep this in mind when you talk to organizations that are choosing where to host.
Industry reactions
Almost everyone in the industry is staying silent. VK, MWS (the cloud business of mobile operator MTS), IXcellerate, 3data, Selectel and Oxygen (the six largest players in the market) did not respond to a request from Kommersant, a Russian business daily. According to the operators the outlet interviewed, the decree caught the market off guard. Only RTK-TsOD (Rostelecom’s data center subsidiary) publicly stated that it is ready to comply and has started auditing its resources.
According to our industry source, operators are privately discussing a new service model dubbed “risk traffic.” Under this arrangement, a customer can lose connectivity at any moment with 24 hours’ notice. People in the industry are also wondering whether the same people who spent years demanding that infrastructure move to Russia are now proposing to move it back out.
Operators are also discussing ways to reduce the assessment base. The decree applies to those who earn money from leasing. If an operator uses part of a site for its own needs, the reserve is calculated from the volume of services it provides. However, it is unclear whether this will work in practice. Operators have not yet received the calculation methodology, and the government has not yet appointed the members of the subcommission that will decide on requisitions.
International comparisons
The idea that the state might need private computing capacity is not new. But the details matter.
In the US, the Defense Production Act of 1950 allows the government to require a company to fulfill government orders ahead of commercial ones. Each order is assigned one of two priority ratings and takes precedence over other orders. Russia is taking its own path. In the US, the government places an order and pays a negotiated price. In Russia, the state requisitions capacity at a rate that it sets itself. The US procedure is set out in a law and its implementing regulations. Russia relies on a decree that refers to a future methodology. Most importantly, the US mechanism governs the priority of new orders. It does not cut off customers who already use a service.
In September 2024, the UK designated data centers as part of its Critical National Infrastructure, alongside the energy and water sectors. In practice, this means a dedicated government team that works with the industry, priority access to cybersecurity support from security agencies, and coordinated emergency services during incidents. Critical infrastructure status protects operators. It does not oblige them to hand over a tenth of their capacity.
In China, the Emergency Response Law allows the requisition of material resources, but with two conditions. The requisition must be tied to a declared emergency, and compensation follows afterward. The amount of compensation is set by law, rather than by the body requisitioning the resources.
Usually, operators know the time frames and the grounds, and the party requisitioning the resources does not set the price. Putin’s decree does not declare a state of emergency and sets no time limit for the “temporary measures.” The same subcommission that decides on requisitions also sets the payment cap.
Will Ukraine consider Russian data centers legitimate military targets?
In October 2026, Ukrainian drones struck data centers belonging to Yandex, Sber and VK, causing large-scale outages across RuNet (the Russian segment of the internet). The Armed Forces of Ukraine attacked Russian services after Russia struck the internet infrastructure of Ukrainian companies in Kyiv at the end of September. The Russian drone strikes left about 100,000 households without internet access, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky promised retaliatory strikes on Russian data centers.
Not all attacks on data centers come from the air. On November 2, the night before the decree was published, unknown attackers targeted the infrastructure of hosting provider Beget. They gained access to the infrastructure’s management plane and executed data-wiping scripts. The attack wiped out the cloud infrastructure. Binary backups of virtual servers were completely lost, and file-level backups remain available to about half of customers. By November 6, Beget had restored more than 60% of its hosting.
Also on November 2, hackers stole 23 TB of data from Rosstat (Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service).
Tom’s Hardware notes that if anyone still doubted whether data centers count as legitimate targets, the decree put those doubts to rest. In effect, it declared all private data centers dual-use facilities. The requirement to hand capacity over to the state changes the status of a commercial site. Ten percent of each facility’s capacity is now effectively at the state’s disposal, serving the authorities’ interests in the military conflict.
Using private data centers as cover during drone attacks is like using private infrastructure or residential buildings to house military personnel.